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Taking Stock: Why the Supreme Court’s Decision to Apply
the Market-Value Standard in Horne II Further Complicates
the Just Compensation Requirement
GREG SEIDNER*
ABSTRACT
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not prevent the federal (or
a state) government from taking private property. It merely sets as a
condition that the government pay the owner “just compensation” for the
taking. Precisely what constitutes just compensation, however, is a tricky
matter. One method for determining just compensation is the “marketvalue” method, which, unsurprisingly, requires the government to pay the
owner the property’s market value. But where a taking is only partial, that
is, where the government takes only a portion of an individual’s property, the
property that remains with the owner may see an increase or decrease in its
value. A line of Supreme Court cases suggests that this incidental benefit (or
harm) should be quantified and set off from the ultimate amount the
government pays.
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court adhered to
the market-value method even though the regulation at issue required that
California raisin growers turn over only a portion of their raisin crop each
year. What is more, the program was specifically designed to stabilize prices
and afford raisin farmers myriad benefits. While adhering to the marketvalue standard provided the Court with a measure of expediency, this Note
argues that the Court’s decision may spell trouble for future regulation. If
regulators cannot consider incidental economic effects in determining
regulatory costs, the government may be forced to pay artificially inflated
prices for regulations that involve takings. Such a result could make
regulation overall more costly, or worse, discourage it entirely.
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INTRODUCTION
The characterization of a large federal government as bumbling and inept
is far from novel.
Indeed, dissatisfaction with the post-New Deal
bureaucracy has been a rallying point of political commentary for decades, if
not for the better part of a century.1 Commentators often generalize, lumping
politicians and constituents into categories defined by “big government” or
“small government.” As with any generalization, these descriptors are in no
way exhaustive, as segments of traditional political ideologies are
continuously branching off, reforming, and reinventing themselves.2 Still,
the debate over the role (and particularly the size) of the federal government
remains fervent across the board. This debate has led to an increased focus
on the perceived overreach of numerous federal regulatory programs.3
Ideological division and debate is not limited to the political sphere. The
current Supreme Court bench is viewed by some as one of the most
ideologically divided Courts in history.4 In fact, the Roberts Court has seen
the highest percentage of 5-to-4 decisions (around 21%) than any other Court

1

See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV.
421, 421–22 (1987).
2
The Tea Party, to name one of the more notable examples, enjoyed
unexpected success during the 2010 midterm elections as the Republican party
regained control of the House of Representatives. Paul Harris & Ewen MacAskill,
US midterm election results herald new political era as Republicans take House,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/03/usmidterm-election-results-tea-party [https://perma.cc/HL2Y-LMK3].
3
See id. (discussing the priorities of the then-incoming Republican majority in
the house, including its plans to aggressively attack President Obama’s landmark
healthcare reform).
4
See, e.g., David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of
the
Supreme
Court,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Jun.
29,
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-andpoliticization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/ [https://perma.cc/TBZ2-859P].
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before it.5 Often times, this division coalesces around the scope of the
federal government’s regulatory powers over individuals and the states.6
Admittedly, the case from the Court’s 2014–15 term that this Note will
treat in depth, Horne v. Department of Agriculture (Horne II),7 does not
readily present as such an ideologically divisive case. In Horne II,8 the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) marketing order mandating that California raisin
growers set aside a portion of their crop for the federal government every
year, free of charge. The Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937
(“AMAA”)9 gives the USDA the authority to issue such marketing orders to
maintain a balanced and orderly market. After obtaining title to growers’
raisins, an administrative committee (composed of other raisin growers,
raisin handlers, and one layperson) disposes of the raisins as it sees fit to
effectuate the purposes of the marketing order, that is, to maintain a level
market, secure stable prices, and ensure growing, inspection, and productquality standards.
In 2002, the Hornes, raisin growers and handlers, refused to set aside the
required reserve portion and the government levied a fine of over $680,000
against them. The Hornes challenged the marketing order as a violation of
the Takings Clause, which prohibits the federal government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation.10 The district
court found that no taking had occurred, and the Court of Appeals agreed,
also holding that the marketing order itself did not constitute an
impermissible regulatory taking.11
The Hornes appealed, and the Supreme Court divided 8-to-1 in reversing
the lower court’s decision and holding that the raisin reserve program was
5

Id.; see also Lucas Rodriguez, The Troubling Partisanship of the
Supreme Court, STAN. POL. J. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://stanfordpolitics.com/thetroubling-partisanship-of-the-supreme-court-da9fd5a900ac#.q8udw2wr9
[https://perma.cc/YHT8-S38Q].
6
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (5-to-4;
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to license same-sex
marriages and recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.
Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015) (5-to-4; concerning facially the propriety of Oklahoma’s
three-drug lethal injection cocktail, but perhaps more realistically addressing the
death penalty in general).
7
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
8
The general facts of Horne II touched on in this Introduction are discussed in
greater detail infra at Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin Marketing
Order.
9
Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (1937).
10
Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2424–25 (laying out the facts giving rise to the Hornes
cause of action); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11
See infra Part III. Horne II & (Un)Just Compensationfor a more detailed
description of Horne II’s procedural history.
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indeed a taking requiring just compensation.12 Yet the issue of whether the
Court should remand to the Ninth Circuit to consider whether participation in
the marketing program offered any quantifiable incidental benefit, and if that
benefit should be set-off against the value of the taken raisins, divided the
Court along ideological lines. The majority held that there was no
quantifiable incidental benefit to participating in the program and determined
that the “market value” standard for just compensation should be used to set
compensation levels.13 Since the government had already calculated the
market value of the raisins in assessing its fine against the Hornes, the Court
held that there was no reason for a new calculation.14 Instead, it simply
relieved the Hornes of their obligation to pay.15
The majority’s brief treatment of this argument makes the issue seem
unimportant. Proceeding no further than the majority opinion, a reader might
view Horne II as little more than the Court’s conservative bloc pruning what
had become (in its view) an overreaching and antiquated New Deal-era
agricultural program. But the concurring opinion in Horne II reveals a more
complicated, nuanced picture. This Note argues that the concurrence more
accurately perceives the importance of the issue, which is vital to the future
of federal Takings Clause jurisprudence.
Part I outlines a brief history of the pertinent aspects of the Court’s
takings jurisprudence.
The Takings Clause has been particularly
troublesome for the Court, in large part due to a dearth of historical
information on the colonial-era understanding of government takings. This
uncertainty has led to varying suppositions concerning the extent to which
the Takings Clause was intended to constrain the government, and the debate
persists to this day.16 Part I also introduces the issue of just compensation,
and the two methods of determining compensation with which Horne II
struggled.17
Part II describes the Raisin Marketing Order’s history in more depth, and
analyzes the AMAA and the USDA’s subsequent regulations from a
purposive standpoint. The regulatory scheme was born, arguably in
substantial part, from a desire to benefit the American consumer through
establishing growing and quality standards, as well as the American farmer
by stabilizing the market for and prices of agricultural commodities.18
12

Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Justices Kagan
and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in his partial concurrence, while Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas joined the Chief Justice’s majority opinion.
13
Id. at 2432.
14
Id. at 2433.
15
Id.
16
See infra Part I.A
17
See infra Part I.B.
18
See infra Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin Marketing
Order.
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Part III discusses the Horne II opinion in detail, focusing primarily on
just compensation. The majority briefly treated this issue at the close of the
opinion and retreated to a formalistic position on how to calculate
compensation, that is, looking only to the raisins’ market value. But this
Note argues that modern courts are capable of a more accurate valuation. By
neglecting to consider the benefits that the marketing order afforded to the
individual growers and handlers when calculating just compensation—
especially in circumstances where such benefits are readily ascertainable—
the Court struck an unjust balance between private and public interests.
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion recognized this nuanced position, but did
not fully expound on why the position was of such importance.19
This Note will do just that, albeit briefly. The final section of Part III
hypothesizes as to the future of Takings Clause jurisprudence in the wake of
Horne II. It offers an example of why the Court’s decision to strictly (and
perhaps blindly) adhere to a formalistic standard of just compensation may
spell serious trouble for future government action.20
I. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION
The text of the Constitution does not forbid the federal government from
taking private property; it merely creates as a condition to a taking that the
government must compensate the property owner.21 Of course, as is often
the case, a simple turn of constitutional phrasing never yields proportionately
simple jurisprudence. The body of Takings Clause law has ballooned and
evolved over time, but it generally coalesces into two categories: (1)
paradigmatic per se takings, wherein the government physically appropriates
or dispossesses an individual of his or her property;22 and (2) regulatory
takings, wherein a regulation or law has the effect of dispossessing a property
owner of his or her property or its economic value.23 This Part describes
generally the origins and treatments of these two categories of takings, and
then discusses the issue of just compensation.
A. Physical Takings
When a layperson considers governmental takings (which this author is
certain the average individual does on a regular basis), he or she probably
imagines the doctrine of eminent domain. This doctrine allows the
19

See infra part III.B.
See infra part III.C.
21
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (quoting First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314 (1987)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
23
Id.
20
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government (state or federal) to take private property without the owner’s
consent.24 This power, as with all takings, is conditioned on the government
providing the owner with just compensation.25 With regards to eminent
domain, the government is also restricted to taking private property for a
“public purpose.”26
The requirement that the government provide just compensation in order
to exercise its taking power, as an equitable matter, makes sense. On one
hand, the power of the government to appropriate private property for public
use—potentially against the will of the private property owner—makes us
uneasy; on the other, a private individual’s interests should not be allowed to
unilaterally obstruct the government when the government acts on the
public’s behalf and for the public’s benefit.27
The earliest instances of governmental takings involved the direct
appropriation of physical property.28 But eminent domain was only the
beginning. Soon, the Supreme Court was addressing not only the permanent
appropriation of private property, but also temporary “physical invasion[s] . .
. and [the] practical ouster” of property owners.29 As an example of this
latter variety, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Causby30 that
frequent flights directly over a landowner’s property constituted a taking.31
Though the owner was not permanently deprived of his or her property, the
government had constructively achieved the same result. Accordingly, this
grouping of both permanent occupations and recurring invasions is deemed
“categorical” or “per se,” as no justification of public purpose allows the
government to avoid paying the property owner.32
24

Rex Realty Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 322 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 529
26
Mt. San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Superior Court, 151 P.3d 1166, 1175
(Cal. 2007). The Supreme Court has pulled essentially all of the Public Use Clause’s
teeth, however. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by
the Public Use Clause.”).
27
For a thorough discussion of the concerns behind governmental takings before
and after enactment of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, see generally
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785–92 (1995).
28
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 (2002) (“Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings
is as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward
application of per se rules.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014
(1992); see also Treanor, supra note 27, at 785–92.
29
Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879) (emphasis added).
30
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
31
Id. at 261.
32
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014–16.
25
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B. Regulatory Takings
The second category of takings, regulatory takings, first arose in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.33 There, Justice Holmes recognized that
“[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”34 Put
another way, “government regulation of private property may, in some
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation
or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable.”35
Clearly, the terms “direct appropriation” and “ouster” help tie regulatory
takings to their physical brethren. But instead of the airplane flying overhead
that deprives the property owner of the use and enjoyment of her land (as in
Causby, for example) it is the effect of a law or regulation that does so.
Because of the intangible nature of regulatory takings, determining
whether one has occurred requires an “ad hoc” approach that weighs all
relevant facts.36 This is perhaps the most important distinguishing feature
between physical takings and regulatory takings: if the regulation does not
“go too far,” then there has not been a taking that requires just
compensation.37 The rationale behind this is practical in nature. Propertyuse regulations are so prevalent that if each instance were considered a
compensable, categorical taking, the government would wind up paying
property owners hand over fist.38 Accordingly, a court reviewing an alleged
regulatory taking weighs the extent to which the regulation has invaded the
property owner’s interests against the government’s inherent right to set
limits and conditions on private actors’ behavior,39 affording “[t]he greatest
weight . . . to the judgment of the Legislature.”40
There are, however, certain examples of regulatory takings for which the
Court has categorically stated that compensation is due; indeed, these
regulatory intrusions are so invasive as to qualify as per se takings.41
33

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 415.
35
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
36
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Penn Central), 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978).
37
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 323.
38
Id.
39
See Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”); see also Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992) (noting an even broader ability
to regulate when the property at issue is personal property, “by reason of the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings”).
40
Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
41
See Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (discussing in particular Loretto and Lucas).
34
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Perhaps the most famous of these categorical regulatory takings occurred in
Lucas v. Southern Carolina Coastal Council. In Lucas, the plaintiff bought
two beachfront properties in South Carolina.42 Soon thereafter, the state
enacted a Beachfront Management Act, which prevented the plaintiff from
erecting permanent habitable structures on his land.43 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, held that where a regulation deprives a property owner of
“all economically beneficial use” of her land, the regulation constitutes a per
se, or categorical, taking.44 The only way South Carolina could save its
sweeping regulation of the whole state’s coastline from constituting a taking
would be to show that building habitable dwellings on the coast constituted a
public nuisance at common law.45
Another example of where the Court has found government regulation to
effect a taking per se was in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.46 In Loretto, a New York state statute required that a landlord permit
cable television companies to install cable equipment on his or her
property.47 The defendant cable television company had installed cable
equipment on the property while it was under a previous owner’s
management.48 Once the plaintiff discovered the equipment after acquiring
the property, she brought suit against the company under the Takings
Clause.49
The Supreme Court held that the statute worked as an
unconstitutional taking in that it required landlords to suffer a permanent
physical occupation of their property, albeit an occupation of a very small
area.50 The Court’s reasoning was hybrid in nature: it examined the statute as
a regulatory taking under Penn Central51 and yet also noted the physical
nature of the defendant’s occupation pursuant to the statute.52 The Court
nonetheless purported to reaffirm only the traditional rule that “permanent
physical occupation of property is a taking,” and that a state may yet regulate
as to building codes, just not where such regulation requires a property
holder to suffer a physical taking.53

42

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07.
Id. at 1007.
44
Id. at 1027.
45
See id. at 1031.
46
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
47
Id. at 423.
48
Id. at 421–22.
49
Id. at 424.
50
Id. at 438.
51
Id. at 425–27.
52
Id. at 438 (“Teleprompter's cable installation on appellant's building
constitutes a taking under the traditional [permanent occupation] test. The
installation involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and
screws to the building . . . .”).
53
See id. at 426–27.
43
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Some prominent commentators question the tenability of regulatory
takings altogether.54 William Treanor, for instance, noted that while Justice
Holmes position on regulatory takngs in Pennsylvania Coal is appealing at
first blush, it finds no basis in the “text, original understanding, [or] early
interpretations of the Takings Clause.”55 Justice Blackmun argued likewise
in his dissenting opinion in Lucas, stating that “James Madison, the author of
the Takings Clause, apparently intended it to apply only to direct, physical
takings of property by the Federal Government.”56
Further, though
contemporary accounts from the Taking Clause’s passage are in “short
supply,” the clause would have originally been intended to prevent arbitrary
government action, not protect value.57 Textual foundation aside, what is
clear is that the ad hoc analysis applied to alleged regulatory takings affords
judges considerable leeway in determining if compensation is due.58
C. Just Compensation
Once a court finds that a taking has occurred, the next step is determining
what measure of compensation is owed to the property owner.59 As a textual
matter, the Constitution says nothing of how to determine compensation, and
it certainly does not equate “compensation” with “value.”60 Naturally, the
presence of an undefined term in the Constitution has bred confusion. Olson
v. United States,61 an early Supreme Court Takings Clause case, succinctly
stated that the compensation due for a governmental taking is “the market
value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in

54

See generally Treanor, supra note 27, at 803.
Id.
56
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing William
Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985)); but see Andrew S.
Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis
“Goes Too Far”, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 242 (1999) (arguing that, due to the
sparseness of historical information and conflicting contemporary understandings,
the Takings Clause can and should be interpreted to cover as much ground as the text
allows, and regulatory takings certainly fall within this ambit).
57
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057 n.23 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 58–60 (1964)).
58
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (noting that “[s]ince
Mahon we have given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with
deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory
taking”).
59
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60
See id.; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1897) (“[T]he constitution does
not require that value should be paid, but that compensation should be given.”).
61
292 U.S. 246 (1934).
55
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money.”62 The rationale behind the “market-value” method is simple: the
property owner “is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if
his property had not been taken . . . . He must be made whole but is not
entitled to more.”63 But what precisely it means to be “made whole” is not so
evident.
At minimum, being made “whole” implies a determination of what has
been taken. But in certain circumstances, this irreducible minimum will be
insufficient. Where the taking is only partial, that is, where the taker leaves
behind some property, the market-value method unravels.64 The remaining
property’s value will be affected not simply by the loss, but by other factors,
such as what incidental effects the taking might have had the remaining
property.65 In circumstances where the taking increases the remaining
property’s value, offering full reimbursement for the market value of the
taken portion will afford the owner a windfall. Conversely, if by taking a
portion of property the government reduces the value of what remains,
offering only the property’s market value will undercompensate the owner.
In Bauman v. Ross, the Supreme Court recognized this predicament, and
introduced a “set-off” method of valuation.66 Bauman held that “when part
only of a parcel of land is taken . . . the value of that part is not the sole
measure of the compensation or damages to be paid to the owner; but the
incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to be considered.”67
The Supreme Court would go on to apply this principle numerous times,
setting off non-monetary or incidental benefits against the total market value
of the property taken.68
62

Id. at 255.
Id.
64
See Bauman, 167 U.S. at 569–70; see also Tim Kowal, The Restitutionary
Approach to Just Compensation, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 453, 471 (2006) (discussing
instances where simply assessing the damage done to the aggrieved property owner
is insufficient to calculate appropriate compensation).
65
See e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376–77 (1943) (stating that, in
certain instances where condemnation of property raises the value of adjacent
property, such benefit should be factored into compensation); Borough of Harvey
Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 (N.J. 2013) (holding that the storm protection
afforded by the construction of a beachfront dune must be considered in calculating
just compensation for nearby property owners); see also Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at
2434–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (enumerating many other cases in which the
Court has assessed incidental benefits done to property owners through the taking
itself in determining just compensation).
66
Bauman, 167 U.S. at 569–70. This note will refer to the method established in
Bauman as the “Bauman doctrine.”
67
Id. at 574.
68
See Horne II, at 2434–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (listing numerous
examples of Supreme Court precedent including United States v. Sponenbarger, 308
U.S. 256, 266–67 (1939) (“[I]f governmental activities inflict slight damage upon
63
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II. THE AMAA AND THE CALIFORNIA RAISIN MARKETING ORDER
Marketing orders originated in various forms in the decades before the
Dust Bowl period.69 The AMAA codified the practice of and procedure for
implementing and structuring these orders.70 The AMAA was not Congress’
first attempt at stabilizing agricultural markets and commodity prices. In
1929 Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Act,71 appropriating $500
million to the Federal Farm Board with instructions to achieve these goals.72
Unfortunately, the stock market spiraled downwards only a few months later
and agricultural commodity prices went with it.73 Congress regrouped and
passed the Agricultural Adjustments Act of 1933.74 The Agricultural
Adjustment Act was broad in scope, and in its initial publication went as far
as to make a “Declaration of Emergency,” which stated in pertinent part:
That the present acute economic emergency being in part the
consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the
prices of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity
has largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for
industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange of
commodities, and has seriously impaired the agricultural
assets supporting the national credit structure . . .75
The Supreme Court held the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional in
1936,76 but Congress was undeterred. Congress passed the AMAA in 1937,
picking up where the Agricultural Marketing Act left off, and amended its
initial declaration of policy to state more modest goals. Nonetheless, the
original intentions of Congress remain clear: to create and maintain “orderly

land in one respect and actually confer great benefits when measured in the whole, to
compensate the landowner further would be to grant him a special bounty. Such
activities in substance take nothing from the landowner.”)).
69
Stacie L. Melikian, California Raisins: Compliance with the Federal
Marketing Order and Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, 5 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 89, 90 (2006).
70
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 601–674. The irony of the Act’s title has not been lost on
commentators, given that the purpose of the act is to authorize mandatory marketing
orders, rather than voluntary “Agreements.” Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural
Philosophies and Policies in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 344 (1983).
71
Agricultural Marketing Act, ch. 24, 46 Stat. 11 (1929).
72
Breimyer, supra note 70, at 339.
73
Id.
74
See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 43 Stat. 31 (1933).
75
Id.
76
U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (finding that Congress’ use of its power
to tax and spend in order to regulate the agricultural industry was impermissible).
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marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce . .
.” so as to “avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices.”77
The AMAA singled out numerous agricultural commodities as specific
regulatory targets, including California raisins.78 Based on the statute’s
language, these commodities are regulated in this fashion in order to create
and maintain “orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in
interstate commerce . . .” and to “establish minimum standards of quality,
maturity, grading, and inspection requirements.”79 Pursuant to this statutory
authority, the Secretary of Agriculture (the “Secretary”) promulgated the
marketing order for Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California. The
sections of the order relevant to this Note are §§ 989.66 and 989.67, which
pertain to “free-tonnage” and “reserve-tonnage” raisins, and how the
Secretary acquires and disposes of them.
According to the marketing order, the Raisin Administrative Committee
(“RAC”), a group of raisin producers and handlers,80 administers the
marketing order and acts as an intermediary between the Secretary and other
raisin farmers.81 Once a year, the RAC recommends a percentage of raisins
that should physically be set aside by handlers pursuant to the order—this
constitutes the “reserve tonnage.”82 This percentage can vary drastically: in
1983 the RAC recommended reserving 62.5% of the crop, but in 2005 only
17.5%.83 Pursuant to the RAC’s decision, producers deliver their harvest to
handlers, who set aside reserve-tonnage raisins for the RAC and pay
producers for the “free-tonnage” raisins.84 The free-tonnage raisins are those
raisins not set aside pursuant to the marketing order that the handlers will sell
commercially on the producers’ behalf.85 After collecting the reserve
tonnage raisins from the handlers and tracking the quantities each producer
contributes, the RAC disposes of the reserve as it sees fit, but always in
accordance with the general guidelines of 7 C.F.R. § 989.67(b).86 Generally,
the RAC will sell the reserve tonnage raisins in non-competitive markets, to
other federal agencies, or to foreign governments and importers.87 At the end
of the season, the RAC returns the proceeds from its sales on a pro rata basis
77

7 U.S.C. § 602(1), (4).
Id. at § 608c(6)(I).
79
Id. at § 602.
80
Under 7 C.F.R. § 989.26, the 47-person committee consists of 35 raisin
producers, 10 handlers, one representative of the collective bargaining association,
and one lay person.
81
See id. at § 989.63.
82
Id. at § 989.54(d).
83
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., No. CV–F–08–1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362,
at *25 n.9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), rev’d, Horne II.
84
See 7 C.F.R. § 989.66.
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to the original participating producers, who have retained an equitable
interest in the reserve tonnage throughout the process.88
Courts have characterized the purpose of the marketing order in different
ways. The Supreme Court, for instance, described the AMAA’s overall
regulatory scheme as designed to “help maintain stable markets for particular
agricultural products.”89 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, in an opinion
the Supreme Court would later reverse, noted that “[t]he program’s goal is to
keep raisin supply relatively constant from year to year, smoothing the raisin
supply curve and thus bringing predictability to the market for producers and
consumers alike.”90 According to the USDA’s marketing policy in § 989.54,
the RAC must also consider such factors as raisin quality, grade, and
consumer income levels when setting the reserve percentage.91 The variety
of factors the RAC is instructed to take into account in setting the reserve
percentage reflects the varied goals of the program.
Because the RAC may be particularly concerned with one aspect of the
market or consumer welfare one year and something entirely different in
other years, it becomes difficult to accurately quantify the benefits of the
program. One empirical study of the raisin marketing order from the early
1990s noted this difficulty.92 The authors stated rather equivocally that
consumers were not made worse off . . . , that the program
reduced the variability of prices and return . . . , [g]rower
average net returns may or may not have increased . . . ,
[and] [o]verall, the results of the study suggest the public
interest may have been well served by the raisin control
program, or at worst, there was no significant welfare loss.93
Despite these less-than-definitive results, the study’s conclusion
demonstrates that the program often affords the general consuming public
and the raisin producers and handlers benefits along a number of different
metrics.
The RAC itself is composed only of persons “actively engaged in the
business of the group which he represents either in his own behalf, or as an
officer, agent, or employee of a business unit engaged in such business.”94
88
89
90

II.
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7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h).
Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2419, 2424 (2015).
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Horne

7 C.F.R. § 989.54(e).
See Ben C. French & Carole Frank Nuckton, An Empirical Analysis of
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And this direct representation on the RAC cannot be far removed: “only
producers . . . engaged as such with respect to the most recent grape crop, are
eligible to serve on the Committee . . . [and] [o]nly handlers who packed or
processed raisins during the then current crop year shall be eligible to
represent handlers on the Committee.”95 The relevant regulations also leave
the administration of the marketing order largely, if not entirely, in the hands
of the community it was designed to benefit. This, along with the fact that
the RAC receives no federal funding,96 demonstrates a conscious attempt to
incentivize the RAC’s good-faith behavior and maximize the agricultural
community’s and the public’s ultimate benefit.97
III. HORNE II & (UN)JUST COMPENSATION
In 2004, an Administrator of the Agriculture Marketing Service filed a
complaint at the USDA against the Hornes, raisin farmers for nearly fifty
years as well as handlers under the marketing order, for violation of the
AMAA.98 The Administrator levied a fine of over $680,000 against the
Hornes, including the USDA’s assessment of the unremitted reserve tonnage
pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 989.166(c), and a civil fine of approximately
$200,000.99 While an appeal of their administrative case remained pending,
the Hornes filed suit in the Eastern District of California, seeking declaratory
relief on various grounds, one of which was the Takings Clause.100 The
district court held that, since no physical taking occurred, the Fifth
Amendment claim must fail.101
95
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Id. at § 989.82 (“All pool expenses shall be deducted from the proceeds
obtained by the committee from the sale or other disposal of such reserve raisins held
for the account of the committee.”).
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1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, Horne II.
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1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012). The court found that, since the Hornes had brought suit
in their capacity as raisin producers rather than handlers, they were required to first
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The Court of Appeals agreed that the Hornes had not suffered a
“paradigmatic” taking, and decided to wade through the “doctrinal thicket of
the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.”102 The court
reasoned that “[b]ecause the government neither seized any raisins from the
Hornes’ land nor removed any money from the Hornes’ bank account, the
Hornes cannot—and do not—argue they suffered this sort of ‘paradigmatic
taking.’”103 This conclusion is predicated upon the fact that in the year the
Hornes refused to comply with the marketing order, no property changed
hands. The Hornes found themselves in administrative hot water for the very
reason that they did not deliver their share of raisins to the RAC. The
decisive question, then, at least to the Court of Appeals, was whether the fine
was the result of an unconstitutional regulatory program.104 The court
answered that question in the negative.105
A. Personal vs. Real Property–Does it Make a Difference?
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the marketing order effected a
taking of private property for which compensation was due.106 As a
threshold matter, the Court held that the government’s duty to compensate
for an unlawful taking does not depend on whether the property taken is
personal or real property.107 The Constitution does not distinguish between
personalty and realty in the Takings Clause.108 The Court also stated that
“[n]othing in the . . . history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents,
suggests that the rule [regarding per se takings] is any different when it
comes to appropriation of personal property.”109 Unfortunately, this
contention is not entirely accurate.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that a “property owner necessarily expects
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police
powers.”110 He went on to clarify that this expectation is even more
pronounced
133 S. Ct. 2053, 2064 (2013). Since the Hornes had raised the Takings Clause issue
as an affirmative defense to the government’s administrative action, the Hornes
could challenge the fine on constitutional grounds in District Court pursuant to 7
U.S.C. § 608c(14). Id. at 2063–64.
102
Horne, 750 F.3d at 1138.
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Id. at 1144.
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Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015).
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Id. at 2425.
108
See U.S. CONST. amend V.
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Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
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Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (citing Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1979)).
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in the case of personal property, [where] by reason of the
State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial
dealings, [the property owner] ought to be aware of the
possibility that new regulation might even render his
property economically worthless (at least if the property’s
only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale).111
This proposition’s applicability to the Horne’s personal property, their
raisins, does not require a great leap of reason. The Hornes, and all raisin
growers similarly situated, certainly had reason to know that the federal
government had an interest in regulating their personal property—California
raisins had been subject to the marketing order for decades.112 Further, the
Hornes did not dispute that the raisins’ only economically productive use was
in their eventual sale.113 The Court offered no explanation for its deviation
from Justice Scalia’s reasoning. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts made
certain to set forth at the outset of his opinion that the Takings Clause
protects property “without any distinction between different types.”114
B. Unjust Compensation?
Putting aside the question of whether the marketing order constitutes a
taking,115 this Note argues that the more problematic oversight was the
111
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See generally supra Part II. The AMAA and the California Raisin
Marketing Order.
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See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14275) (acknowledging that agricultural products “are in a sense fungible and useful to
the businesses that deal in them only by generating revenue” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
115
Justice Sotomayor offers an exhaustive (and well reasoned) analysis of why
the majority’s holding as to whether the marketing order constitutes a taking is
incorrect. See generally id. at 2437–43 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The
thrust of her argument is that, in relying on Loretto, the Hornes’ had failed to state a
claim, since Loretto “only applies where all property rights have been destroyed by
governmental action.” Id. at 2437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Since the marketing
order did not destroy all of the raisin growers’ rights (the growers retained the future
pro rata right to the reserve tonnage), the order could not constitute a taking. Id. at
2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This Note agrees largely with this analysis—in
particular with Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion that the majority fundamentally
misunderstands Loretto. In Loretto, the property owner was required by statue to
suffer a permanent physical occupation of her property. See supra discussion
accompanying notes 46–53. On its face, the marketing order requires the RAC to
112
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Court’s decision to rely on the “market-value” standard to calculate just
compensation instead of striving for a more realistic assessment of
compensation through the Bauman doctrine.116 Just compensation was not
central to the case, and, indeed, was not one of the questions presented in the
petition for writ of certiorari.117 Accordingly, the Court dealt with the matter
only in the majority opinion’s closing paragraphs, holding that “[t]he
Government has already calculated the amount of just compensation in this
case, when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins:
$483,843.53.”118 Estopping the government from seeking a different
calculation certainly afforded the court a measure of expediency. But the
cost of estoppel in this instance, and the similar instances that may follow,
could turn out to be greater than expected.
As Justice Breyer illustrated in his concurrence, Bauman v. Ross
established an exception to the “fair-market-value” calculation for just
compensation where only a portion of land was taken.119 As Justice Breyer
argued, Bauman and its progeny are relevant to Horne II because “the benefit
[to the Hornes as a result of the marketing order] might equal or exceed the
value of the raisins taken . . . [and] [i]n that case, the California Raisin
Marketing Order does not effect a taking without just compensation.”120 It is
therefore curious why the Bauman doctrine did not garner more attention
from the majority.121

maximize the beneficial effect the marketing order is designed to create, and return
the proceeds of the reserve tonnage to the growers. See supra discussion
accompanying notes 90–97. Further, in Loretto, the plaintiff’s property at the time
of the suit was physically occupied by cable equipment, whereas the Hornes had not
complied with the marketing order during the year in question, and had sued to avoid
payment of civil penalties. See supra discussion accompanying notes 102–105.
Therefore, Horne II should have turned only on the constitutionality of the regulation
itself and not on the government’s physical appropriation of raisins. There had been
not been one. Id. Necessarily then, Horne II presented a regulatory takings claim
and not a physical takings claim, though the majority nonetheless seized on the
physical nature of the set-aside and ran with it. Horne II, 135 S. Ct at 2424 (“[A]
percentage of a grower’s crop must be physically set aside . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2432.
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Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2435.
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See id. at 2436 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But
neither am I aware of any precedent that would distinguish between how the Bauman
doctrine applies to the reserve requirement itself and how it applies to other types of
partial takings.”); see also supra Part III.A.
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This Note has explained the benefits that the marketing order was
designed to create.122 Presumably, a court could conduct largely the same
analysis. Along with the aid of expert witnesses, it could then quantify those
benefits and appropriately set them off from the raisins’ market value. But
even ignoring Chief Justice Roberts’ decision to not apply the Bauman
doctrine to this specific case, the majority’s adherence to the market-value
standard is, on its own, problematic.
The reason the majority gives for dismissing the government’s argument
for remand (and the concurring Justices’ concerns) is briefly stated:
“[Bauman and its progeny] raise complicated questions involving the
exercise of the eminent domain power, but they do not create a generally
applicable exception to the usual compensation rule, based on asserted
regulatory benefits of the sort at issue here.”123 As a means of advancing
judicial expediency, this one paragraph rejection is effective. But the quoted
sentence is a conclusion, not an explanation, and a reticence to address
“complicated questions” does nothing to settle them.
The Court may see a distinction with regards to partial real-property
takings pursuant to eminent domain powers and partial personal-property
takings vis-à-vis just compensation. However, the Court in no uncertain
terms held that the requirements attendant to per se takings apply with equal
force whether the underlying property is personalty or realty. A later
implication, even a nuanced one, to the contrary would create an internal
contradiction undermining the majority’s formalistic reasoning.
The more likely rationale is that the Court was concerned with the
practical ramifications of embarking on the more complex Bauman doctrine
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts (thankfully) noted that the government had
cited no support for application of Bauman to personal property takings.124
This does not mean, however, that no such support exists.
In U.S. v. Commodities Trading Corp,125 the Court held that, while
“market value has normally been accepted as a just standard [of determining
compensation] . . . when market value has been too difficult to find, or when
its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public, courts
have fashioned and applied other standards.”126 Likewise, Justice Jackson
argued, albeit in dissent, that a government mandated price should not “be
used as the sole measure of just compensation.”127 The Horne II court would
122
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therefore not have been without precedent in finding an exception to the
general market-value rule. Indeed, given the lengths to which the RAC and
the USDA had gone in ensuring that the marketing order afforded direct
benefits to growers through price and market stability, there is an argument
that applying the market-value standard did result in “manifest injustice” to
some extent.
Legal scholarship is relatively scarce on the applicability of the Bauman
doctrine to personal property,128 but many scholars are unequivocal regarding
the inadequacy of the market-value method to complex takings cases.129 This
Note does not purport to suggest that Bauman should definitively be
incorporated wholesale into all partial-taking just compensation
determinations. That question is beyond the scope of this Note. What this
Note does suggest is that the Bauman doctrine deserves more attention than it
received in Horne II. The majority underestimated the capacity of modern
trial courts to accurately calculate incidental benefits. The following section
elaborates on one commentator’s predictions as to Horne II’s furtherreaching implications.
C. Future Problems
Ryan Cooper of The Week, in his recap of Horne II, posed the following
hypothetical as an example:
Price Control Act. Id. at 122–23. The plaintiff sought a higher price–one closer to
what the pepper might fetch if the price were not artificially suppressed. Id. The
similarities between Commodities Trading Corp. and Horne II are evident, though
the pricing situation is reversed. Both involve agricultural commodities subject to
government programs that intentionally alter the commodity’s price. It is worth
considering whether Commodities Trading Corp. might have come out differently
but for its unique background facts.
128
See, e.g., Gary Knapp, Annotation: Supreme Court's views as to what
constitutes “just compensation” required, under Federal Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment, for taking of private personal property for public use, 155 L. ED. 2d
1185, § 18 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing United States v. Commodities Trading Corp);
John J. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes
For the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1041–
42 (1975) (discussing application of Bauman’s “benefit set-off” method in federal
and state courts and expressing incredulity as to the courts’ arguments that it presents
practical inapplicability).
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See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation
Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (2007) (“[I]n practice, current law settles for the
payment of the market value of the property taken—a benchmark that often falls far
short of the reserve price of the aggrieved owner.”). This and other inadequacies
have been noted by jurists as well, such as Judge Richard Posner, who asserts that
“[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is [] not full compensation, for market
value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but
merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.” Consiton Corp.
v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Consider a climate policy that simultaneously enacted a tax
on carbon pollution and nationalized a bunch of coal
reserves. Those reserves are valuable today because it is
possible to pollute the atmosphere with greenhouse gases
and harm society without paying for the damage. Therefore,
a carbon tax would reduce their value. But under Roberts’
reasoning, the government would be required to pay the
previous (likely enormous) price of the coal without being
allowed to consider the fact that the previous value was
based to a great extent on essentially a theft from the rest of
society. 130
As a doctrinal matter, Mr. Cooper is correct that, if Horne II’s reasoning
were applied, the government would be required to pay the artificiallyenhanced price because just compensation is determined at the time of
taking.131 At least, this is what the market-value method would dictate.132
This example is dramatic and perhaps oversimplified, but it demonstrates
how potentially unjust the resulting compensation windfall would be for the
private property owner, and how concomitantly damaging the results could
be to the public.
A state actor looking to regulate in the field of private property or
property prices should always consider ex ante whether a regulation could
conceivably constitute a taking, and factor that consideration into cost
determinations.133 Where the state actor ignores the private costs of
government action, takings scholars say she is operating under a “fiscal
illusion.”134 Under efficiency-based justifications for the Takings Clause, the
just compensation requirement helps to avoid the fiscal illusion by
constitutionally requiring payment of private costs in the event a planned
government action involves a taking.135 However, as Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomovsky argue, where the government is required to pay only
market value for property, and the market undervalues the private property
by ignoring external factors, the government will take too much.136 The cost

130

Ryan Cooper, How the Supreme Court just quietly rolled back a key element
of
the
New
Deal,
THE
WEEK
(June
24,
2015),
http://theweek.com/articles/562363/how-supreme-court-just-quietly-rolled-back-keyelement-new-deal [https://perma.cc/BE3J-Y64Q].
131
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
132
Id.
133
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 129, at 881–82.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 882.
136
Id.

2016

TAKING STOCK

247

of the taking will be lower. This, of course, would strike an unhealthy
balance between private and public interests.
The type of regulation in Horne II presents the opposite situation: where
the market overvalues property by neglecting the incidental benefits the
owner has already received, the government will be less likely to take, even
if the taking would be beneficial. The cost of such action would be higher.
No matter how sensible the regulation might be, the government would have
to think twice before pursuing it, which on its own would likely compound
costs. In short, a strict adherence to the market-value method of calculating
compensation in complex takings cases has the potential to make regulation
far more costly than it need be.
An application of the Bauman doctrine could alleviate this problem to an
extent. Continuing with Mr. Cooper’s hypothetical, a court could use the
Bauman doctrine to offset the incidental benefit the government’s tax-free
regulatory scheme had provided against the coal’s market price. This would
allow the compensation the government owed to more accurately
approximate the coal’s intrinsic value. Consequently, though the owner
would obtain less than market value for her property, the government would
not be forced to pay again for a boon it had already granted. In this
hypothetical context, and in the context of Horne II, this seems to strike a
more just balancing point between private and public interests.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, under Commodities Trading Corp., the exception to the
market-value method is available “only ‘when market value has been too
difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to
owner or public.’”137 The Court did not provide more explicit guidance as to
when a court may elect to apply Bauman, for instance, as opposed to the
market-value method. But with regards to Horne II, Chief Justice Roberts
implicitly acknowledged the difficulty of adequately determining the reserve
tonnage raisin’s value when he glossed over the just compensation issue at
the close of his opinion. Further, this Note has gone to modest lengths to
demonstrate why the strict, formalistic application of the market-value
method may result in injustice to the public. What Horne II accomplishes,
then, is to draw into serious question the future applicability of Commodities
Trading Corp., and create roadblocks to future governmental regulation. In
short, the Supreme Court squandered a prime opportunity to explore and
settle a nebulous area of law, even with Justice Breyer and his fellow partialdissenters raising the issue.
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